



1 California's reaction to *Caulerpa taxifolia*: a model for invasive species rapid 2 response

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8 response, SCCAT

9 Abstract

10 The invasive marine alga *Caulerpa taxifolia* was discovered June 12, 2000, in California at Agua Hedi-
11 onda Lagoon. Due to a 15-year history of spread in the Mediterranean Sea, *C. taxifolia* had already
12 been placed on the US Federal Noxious Weed list in 1999. Awareness of this threat greatly facilitated
13 consensus building and setting clear eradication goals among a large number of state, federal and local
14 agencies as well as private groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that became the 'South-
15 ern California Caulerpa Action Team' (SCCAT). Field containment and treatments began 17 days after
16 the discovery due to: (1) timely identification and notification of the infestation; (2) the proactive staff of
17 the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board who deemed this invasion tantamount to an 'oil
18 spill', thus freeing up emergency funding; (3) the mobilization of diver crews already working at the site.
19 Three well-integrated components of this rapid response have resulted in an effective eradication pro-
20 gram: (a) expertise and knowledge on the biology of *C. taxifolia*; (b) knowledge on the uses, 'ownership'
21 and characteristics of the infested site; (c) knowledge and experience in the implementation of aquatic
22 plant eradication. Together, with the requisite resources (approximately \$US1.2 million per year), this
23 approach has resulted in containment, treatment and excellent progress toward eradication of *C. taxifo-*
24 *lia*. Successful rapid response to other aquatic invasive species will require similar readiness to act, and
25 immediate access to adequate funding.
26

27 Introduction

28 In order to consider the need for, and optimal
29 components of, effective responses to newly dis-
30 covered invasive species, it is instructive to view
31 these incursions within the context of more gen-
32 eric environmental or health emergencies. The
33 US and indeed most of the developed countries
34 have well-defined systems for responding to the
35 most common types of catastrophies, such as fire,
36 flood, earthquakes or disease outbreaks. The sys-
37 tems are comprised of early warning devices or

networks, and equally important, the physical 38
and human resources needed to react quickly. 39
Societies have generally recognized the huge 40
social and economic costs of delays in response 41
to these untoward, but inevitable occurrences. 42
Unfortunately, there is neither an adequate 43
awareness of the costs, nor are the systems in 44
place to mount a similar action for the analogous 45
disruptions caused by problematic invasive spe- 46
cies, particularly in the marine and freshwater 47
environments. The rampant spread of many inva- 48
sive plants attests to the lack of response capacity 49



(Mullin et al. 2000). A clear example is the reaction to the discovery of northern pike (*Esox lucius*) in Lake Davis, CA during the early 1990s (Lee 2001). The response by the California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG), which consisted of piscicide (rotenone) applications in 1997, resulted in rancorous public objections and litigation. It was not until 1999, nearly four years after the threat was clearly understood by CDFG scientists, that a stakeholder group was formed and a consensus-driven plan was developed (California Department of Fish and Game 2000). Northern pike are still present, but now there is far more unanimity of purpose and a more cooperative atmosphere that can facilitate steps needed to reduce the threat from Northern Pike. However, the costs of delays, in part resulting from inadequate approaches for rapid response, can be measured in years and more than \$9 million in settlement fees (Goedde 1998).

California's recent success in thwarting (at least for now) the introduction of *C. taxifolia*, a marine alga, has revealed both conceptual and practical approaches that are useful as a model for constructive and effective response to incursions of other invasive species. Over the past few years, there have been other published proposals in the US for rapid responses to invasive species (e.g., National Invasive Species Council 2003; FICMNEW 2003; Western Regional Panel 2003). There have also been several state plans developed during the past 5 years to address the threats to aquatic resources posed by a variety of invasive freshwater and marine organisms, including 13 plans approved at this time by the federal Aquatic Nuisance Species Task Force (ANS-TF). These plans also contain rapid response strategies. Target species range from microscopic, ballast water-borne organisms to large vertebrates such as the northern pike and snakehead fish (*Channa argus*), as well as a variety of freshwater and marine plants and invertebrates. However, with a very few exceptions, such as the 25 year-old Hydrilla Eradication Program in California (California Department of Food and Agriculture 2002), the plans at this time are analogous to having a conceptual design for a fire department, but with no fire station, no on-call fire fighters, no pool of effective fire-fighting equipment, no mandate or authorization to fight

fires, and no hands-on training for fire-fighters. As a result, reactions today to new introductions of invasive species are usually far too late, poorly coordinated and often provoke negative reactions from stakeholders who do not understand the threats, costs, risks, and benefits of immediate action as compared to the risks of not responding quickly, decisively and effectively. The public, in short, has a clear grasp of threats from fires and floods, but only the most vague understanding of how invasive species affect their lives. The state plans mentioned above all have public education/outreach components, but realistically, creating an awareness similar to that for fire prevention and fire-hazards will probably take a generation. What can be done now to counter the establishment of new invasive species? What can we learn from the limited examples of successful responses? The recent introduction of the marine alga *C. taxifolia* into a southern California lagoon, Agua Hedionda, and a small embayment called Huntington Harbour provides some answers. The following is a synopsis of the development of the eradication actions, and recommendations for applying lessons learned from the project to the broader concern of invasive species intervention. Other brief accounts of the early phases and various aspects of this project have been reported elsewhere (Anderson 2001, 2002; Anderson and Keppner 2001; Jousson et al. 2001; Williams and Grosholz 2002).

***C. taxifolia* invasion in the US**

Early detection – a fortuitous awareness

The history and almost 20-year spread of *C. taxifolia* in the Mediterranean Sea is well described (Meinesz 1999, 2001). However, until the discovery in California in 2000, no other populations had been documented in the western hemisphere. Agua Hedionda Lagoon is a small (ca. 150 ha total) estuary located about 50 km north of San Diego, CA (Figure 1). It is comprised of three sections: the outer lagoon (adjacent to, and connected with, the Pacific Ocean), the middle lagoon and the inner lagoon; it was in the latter section that *C. taxifolia* was found. The overall lagoon is used for a variety



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


Figure 1. Locations of *C. taxifolia* infestations in California. Arrows show specific areas within sites. Huntington Harbour (upper right); Agua Hedionda Lagoon (lower right).

of public and private activities: recreation (fishing, paddling, water skiing, and wave boarding), power production (i.e., cooling water), aquaculture, and personal watercraft ('jet ski') rentals. Most recreational activities occur in the inner lagoon and therefore subsequent actions to eradicate this invasive species directly affected a variety of stakeholders, including many homeowners adjacent to the lagoon. The Huntington Harbour site occupies about 4 ha and consists primarily of two small, relatively isolated basins surrounded by houses. It is connected via large

pipes to the outer harbor area, which is in turn connected to the ocean.

At the time *C. taxifolia* was discovered in June, 2000, a small team of SCUBA divers was documenting locations and status of native eelgrass beds (*Zostera marina*) as part of contract work for a power plant. Importantly, the dive-team leader recognized that the *C. taxifolia* colony was not part of the normal flora, and quickly notified the California Department of Food and Agriculture staff within the Pest Detection and Exclusion Branch, who then made

170 contacts with those scientists and managers
171 involved with aquatic invasive species control
172 and eradication (Woodfield 2000, personal
173 comm.) Specimens of the plant were sent imme-
174 diately to specialists who could confirm the iden-
175 tity of the species. These critically important
176 steps were taken within 24–72 h after the discov-
177 ery. Later, more detailed genomic analysis con-
178 firmed that this population was identical to the
179 plants that had spread in the Mediterranean
180 areas (Jousson et al. 2001).

181 *Agency and 'non-agency' responses*

182 Within one week after the species was identified,
183 representatives from several California state
184 agencies, federal agencies, and a few key local
185 stakeholders met to assess the threat. In subse-
186 quent meetings, representation expanded to
187 include specialists in phycology. At this juncture,
188 formal options for various actions were dis-
189 cussed, and the group arrived at a consensus to
190 eradicate *C. taxifolia*. During this period, several
191 of the agency representatives inspected the site at
192 Agua Hedionda Lagoon, a critically important
193 step. Understanding the physical characteristics
194 of the site, and its proximity to the open ocean
195 and to recreational and other uses of this lagoon
196 was essential in the overall successful develop-
197 ment of an eradication plan. The fact that one
198 concessionaire's activity was directly affected by
199 proposed eradication operations (e.g., restriction
200 of boat use), as well as the likelihood that the
201 very activity of the customers (i.e., jet skiing and
202 wave boarding) might spread the infestation,
203 resulted in lengthy negotiations between these
204 stakeholders and the Steering Committee of what
205 has become known as the Southern California
206 Caulerpa Action Team, or SCCAT. Discussions
207 and negotiations on other 'passive' uses in the
208 lagoon (e.g., fishing, non-motorized watercraft)
209 were also begun, including informational public
210 workshops that included the non-profit group
211 Agua Hedionda Lagoon Foundation (AHLF)
212 and other affected property owners.

213 This quick progression in the response first
214 involved a few 'official agencies', but very soon
215 included several public and private groups, which
216 ultimately comprised SCCAT (see Appendix 1).
217 Although without any formal jurisdiction, or

direct funding, SCCAT has acted as an advisory
lead consortium whose goal is to implement
eradication plans, and to ensure the success of
the eradication project through judicious, scien-
tifically based monitoring and evaluation. Ini-
tially, monthly meetings, and more recently bi-
monthly meetings have been held for over
4 years. Currently, representatives from five
agencies comprise the Steering Committee: Cali-
fornia Department of Fish and Game, San Diego
Regional Water Quality Control Board, Santa
Ana Regional Water Quality Control board,
NOAA-Fisheries, and US Department of Agri-
culture-Agricultural Research Service. Within
SCCAT, there are separate committees that
address public education, outreach, and technical
issues. The Steering Committee has also worked
directly with stakeholders to develop consensus-
based use plans for Agua Hedionda Lagoon. Fig-
ure 2 shows the overall organization of SCCAT.

The success of SCCAT stems, in large part,
from the personal commitment of the individuals
who have brought their varied experience, exper-
tise, and the support of their respective agencies,
or private affiliations to bear on this problem.
This eradication project was not, however, with-
out early birthing pains. During initial evalua-
tions of the threat from *C. taxifolia* and
discussions of options for response, opinions dif-
fered at both the technical level as well as the
sociological level. It is worth noting that the June

Organization of the Southern California Caulerpa Action Team (SCCAT)




Figure 2. Organizational chart for the SCCAT.

249 2000 infestation was the first known for *C. taxi-*
 250 *folia* in the western hemisphere, and that there
 251 was no successful example of eradicating a mar-
 252 ine alga in the US Legitimate and important
 253 questions were raised: Can this plant be eradi-
 254 cated? Should research be conducted for a while
 255 before eradication is attempted? What is the
 256 potential for dispersal beyond the lagoon? Is it
 257 already off the California coast, but simply unde-
 258 tected? Unfortunately, documented experiences in
 259 the Mediterranean invasion did not bode well for
 260 successful eradication. And yet, experience with
 261 much larger infestations of *Hydrilla verticillata* in
 262 California canals and lakes strongly suggested it
 263 could be done, but only if action were immedi-
 264 ate, effective and unwavering (California Depart-
 265 ment of Food and Agriculture 2002).

266 Other critical questions were raised: What, if
 267 any, recreational activity should be allowed in or
 268 near the infested area? Who has legal authority
 269 to restrict boating and other recreational activi-
 270 ties? For that matter, who owns the lagoon?
 271 Taken together, these were difficult problems.
 272 The solution has been to strike a balance
 273 between actions deemed essential for the project
 274 (containment, treatment and monitoring), and
 275 modifications in public access to, and uses
 276 within, the lagoon.

277 *Operational realities – what to do and how to* 278 *fund it*

279 Once the consensus to eradicate was clear, the
 280 next obvious questions were: How? By what
 281 methods? Who will actually do it? What will it
 282 cost? Who will pay? Within two weeks after dis-
 283 covery, discussions centered on feasibilities for
 284 containment, chemical control, various types of
 285 dredging, draining coupled with construction of
 286 temporary dams, and tarping. In fact, the proba-
 287 bility of successful eradication was questioned
 288 periodically as various methods were evaluated
 289 from the standpoint of cost, potential non-target
 290 impacts, and projected efficacy. For example,
 291 there are no federally registered products for con-
 292 trol of marine algae except boat bottom coatings
 293 (antifouling paints). Thus chemicals (algacides)
 294 would require a special permit from the Califor-
 295 nia Environmental Protection Agency, Depart-
 296 ment of Pesticide Registration (CalEPA/DPR).

In tandem with these discussions, pilot efficacy 297
 testing was performed in small containers with 298
 several registered aquatic herbicides such as 299
 diquat, endothal, chelated copper, fluridone, and 300
 sodium hypochlorite (household bleach). Only 301
 bleach (5% sodium hypochlorite) resulted in 302
 obvious toxicity symptoms (i.e., chlorosis and 303
 eventual disintegration of tissues) with short 304
 exposures of a few hours. Consideration of other 305
 options, such as dredging, quickly revealed the 306
 enormous operational costs, associated disposal 307
 and treatment issues, and concerns for non-target 308
 species. Localized, diver-assisted dredging was 309
 tested in uninfested areas, but the unconsolidated 310
 nature of the lagoon sediments rapidly reduced 311
 visibility and made this option impractical. 312

As the constraints of other methods became 313
 clear, as well as the need to take action, SCCAT 314
 concluded that the best approach for both con- 315
 tainment and treatment of the *C. taxifolia* colo- 316
 nies was construction of small polyvinyl chloride 317
 (pvc) frames that were to be placed over the 318
 plants and then covered with black 20 mil pvc 319
 sheeting. The sizes of the tarps ranged from 320
 500 m² areas for the few large colonies initially 321
 discovered, to about 1 m² for small plants found 322
 in later surveys. The sides of the tarps were 323
 anchored and sealed to the bottom with gravel- 324
 filled bags. An overhang was provided between 325
 the edge of the colony and edge of the bagged 326
 area to ensure that a margin of uninfested area 327
 was also covered and treated (Figure 3). Initially, 328
 liquid sodium hypochlorite (ca. 12% stock solu- 329
 tion) was injected into the tarped areas via ports 330
 in the pvc tarps fitted with caps. Smaller colonies 331
 were later covered with the pvc tarps without a 332
 frame, beneath which several 2.5 cm dia. solid 333
 chlorine-releasing tablets ('pucks') were placed. 334
 The tablets were much easier for SCUBA divers 335
 to handle and required far less equipment than 336
 was required for injecting liquid sodium hypo- 337
 chlorite. Use of chlorine necessitated obtaining a 338
 Research Authorization from Cal EPA/ DPR. 339

Containment and treatments of the largest col- 340
 onies in Agua Hedionda began 17 days after the 341
 discovery of *C. taxifolia*. The rapid deployment 342
 of equipment and the associated treatments 343
 resulted from the fortuitous presence of a SCUBA 344
 team that was already working in the lagoon, and 345
 their commitment toward the eradication goal. 346





Figure 3. Underwater containment and treatment system used to apply chlorine (liquid sodium hypochlorite) to colonies of *C. taxifolia* in Agua Hedionda Lagoon. 20 mil black PVC covers PVC frame. Fitting at top is port through which liquid sodium hypochlorite was pumped by SCUBA divers. (Photograph by L. Anderson.)

The subsequent discovery of *C. taxifolia* in the small embayments at Huntington Harbour, a few weeks after the find in Agua Hedionda, prompted similar containment, though only pvc tarps (without frames) and solid chlorine-releasing tablets were used since the colonies were smaller at this site.

Thus, from an operational perspective, expedient decisions were made based upon the need to act quickly and the desire to use those methods having reasonable probability for success, and which would be least likely to cause off-target concerns. Treatments were therefore confined to the known target 'volume'. The consensus was also that the dissipation of chlorine (dilution, breakdown and inactivation via particulate and dissolved organic matter) would likely be rapid.

An examination of the funding sources for this rapid response, and for continuing eradication actions during the past 3 years, reveals another unique aspect of the SCCAT consortium: the importance of individual efforts and personal commitments. The 'startup' emergency funds (about US\$200,000) came from the San Diego Regional Water Quality Board and Cabrillo Power, LLC (a power plant located on the lagoon). Through the highly focused efforts of an Environmental Specialist on the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board, the invasion of *C. taxifolia* was treated like an oil spill, and thus qualified for emergency funding. As a

result, US\$100,000 became available almost immediately from emergency spill funding sources normally earmarked for 'clean up and abatement'. This example of creative and flexible thinking, coupled with personal dedication, represents the best qualities in regulatory scientists and managers.

The designation as a 'clean up and abatement action' also cleared potentially delaying legal constraints. The Board was able to issue required permits for the project, and CalEPA/DPR placed a high priority on issuance of authorization for use of chlorine. Similarly, when the Huntington Harbour infestation was found, the Santa Ana Regional Water Quality Control Board provided emergency funds for eradication there. The financial commitment from managers and staff at Cabrillo Power, LLC made the initial full treatments of the infestations possible and also served as a firm testament to the importance of achieving successful eradication.

Additional funding eventually followed from NOAA-Fisheries, California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG), and several subsequent grants that were tied to environmental coastal protection goals. Most recently, the California Coastal Conservancy has awarded US\$1.3 million for the next year's (2004) eradication and monitoring efforts. However, due to the 'virtual' status of SCCAT, funds are either channeled directly to the operations contractor, or through the Agua Hedionda Laguna Foundation. SCCAT has served in an advisory, coordinating and reviewing capacity in the eradication efforts. (Appendix 1 summarizes the sources of funds to 2003 that also support public education and outreach, as well as research targeted to specific needs for eradication and detection)

Oversight and quality assurance

The very high profile nature of this project has attracted national and international interest (Dalton 2000, 2001). In fact, shortly after the eradication treatments began, a BBC film crew flew to San Diego expressly to include this work in a special documentary on the spread of *C. taxifolia* in the Mediterranean area. At the same time, the aggressive, eradication-only stance taken by SCCAT, coupled with high anticipated costs (ca.

\$1.2 million per year), provided plenty of fodder early on for second-guessing, and for continuing debates about what type of studies could have or should have been performed in the field short of contain and kill actions. The sources of these concerns derived from: (a) the reality and exigency of responding to a new invasive species with a clear history of detrimental, rapid spread (i.e., the Mediterranean coasts), and (b) divergent perspectives and priorities of scientists experienced with on-the-ground control and eradication approaches compared to the perspectives of their phycologist colleagues who, understandably, wanted the opportunity to investigate this 'new species' *in situ*. Finally, the lack of any recognizable track record of successfully eradicating *C. taxifolia* led some scientist to believe that it could not be done. This prompted discussion of the merits of first studying how it would grow here. Given these circumstances, together with the fact the *Caulerpa* genus, including *C. taxifolia*, comprise some of the most widely sold and shared tropical seawater plants for aquarium enthusiasts, it is no surprise that controversy developed. In addition, highly selective reporting in some media focused on controversial issues, rather than on the significant progress being made by SCCAT (e.g., Dalton 2000, 2001).

454 *Efficacy of treatments*

To develop quality assurance information and to evaluate the efficacy of the tarping and chlorine treatments, a series of sediment samples were taken from beneath the treated/tarped areas in December 2001, and August 2002. The hiatus between initial treatment and assessment was quite purposeful: The Technical Committee within SCCAT reasoned that risks associated with removing tarps and disturbing sediments too soon overrode the desirability of examining the treated plants, especially since the colonies were still well contained under the tarps. By December, 2001, SCCAT felt that adequate time had passed; therefore, following careful removal of sediments using pvc coring tubes, replicated 10 cm dia. by 20 cm deep samples were removed and transported to the USDA-ARS research facility on the UC Davis campus and placed in conditions that would promote growth of viable

fronds or stolons. As a control for this procedure, other cores from similar sediments in unin-fested and untreated areas were removed and inoculated with fronds of *C. taxifolia*: these cores supported continued growth from the fronds. However, in core samples taken inside treated areas from both sampling periods, December and August, no *C. taxifolia* emerged, nor were any intact pieces found 76 and 108 days after planting, respectively. Surprisingly, seedling eelgrass (*Zostera marina*) emerged from several cores from areas that had been previously covered and treated, and some living invertebrates were also present (Anderson 2002, 2003). These assays, therefore, indicated that treatments were successful in killing *C. taxifolia* and that, at least within the samples taken; other organisms survived the treatments, including seed of native eelgrass. Some of these cores were from sites that had been tarped and treated 2 years previously. Further examination of chlorine effects (e.g., dose/response) on *C. taxifolia* is underway (Williams and Schroeder 2003). Additional field assessments are also on going, including removal of small, replicated sections of tarps and monitoring of organisms that re-occupy these areas.

Program review

In order to assess the eradication progress, and to provide a forum for information exchange, the University of California Cooperative Extension hosted an International Conference on *C. taxifolia* at the end of January 2001 in San Diego, 50 km south of the original infestation (California Sea Grant 2002). Experts in *Caulerpa* taxonomy and ecology participated, including scientists from France, Italy, Croatia, and some Australian managers who were just beginning to react to a new *C. taxifolia* infestation. SCCAT was able to report that the first assessments of chlorine-treated areas indicated no potential for re-growth based on bioassay grow-out of sediment cores removed from beneath the tarps (Anderson 2002). Immediately following the conference, a Scientific Review Panel, requested by CDFG, reviewed the SCCAT actions and provided recommendations. Within the 17 recommendations, were several reasonable suggestions, such as: maintaining rapid response capacity (within



30 days after new discovery), defining a lead agency, expanding surveillance in California, conducting risk assessment (for other potential infestation sites), conducting a review of project action protocols, and further investigation of methods to eradicate *C. taxifolia* and other invasive marine algae. However, the panel was divided on whether eradication was possible. For example, when polled as to the likelihood of successful eradication, 6 of the 11 Panel members felt there was less than a 50% probability; whereas five members ranked the chances around 80% (California Department of Fish and Game 2002).

Field monitoring for new growth

As the need for new containment and treatments declined by the end of the second season (fall 2002), the primary task shifted to monitoring for new growth within the Agua Hedionda Lagoon and Huntington Harbour sites. The usual criterion for eradication is quite simple: no living parts can remain to re-infest the site. This may seem trivial, yet searching under water for small, centimeter-sized pieces of fronds is very difficult due to poor visibility, tidal currents, epiphytic growth that can camouflage the plants, and the presence of other macrophytes such as eelgrass (*Z. marina*) that can occlude the divers' view. To accomplish the searches, teams of several divers follow prescribed transect lines laid with GPS units. The search grid provides approximately 1-meter spacing between lines so that some overlap occurs to minimize the chances of missing plants. Survey of the inner lagoon site at Agua Hedionda Lagoon takes approximately 5–7 days to complete, assuming favorable visibility. The search strategy has recently shifted to fewer surveys per year (now one spring and one fall search starting in fall 2003), and more defined search areas based upon historic 'discovery' patterns. Surveys of Huntington Harbour require less time due to the smaller area and generally higher frequency of conditions offering better visibility. Figure 4 shows that from an initial total infestation in Agua Hedionda Lagoon of about 1000 m² (June/July 2000), the area containing new plants declined dramatically during 2001–2002. A similar level of success has been achieved

in Huntington Harbour. In fact, to date (July 2004) no new plants have been found in Agua Hedionda Lagoon since September 2002 or in Huntington Harbour since November 2002. This pattern of reduction is typical for eradication efforts, wherein dramatic reductions may be expected initially, followed by a diminished rate of reduction due to the difficulty in detection of smaller plants or colonies.

Given the increasing challenge of finding small plants, how does one know with some certainty that a zero-detection survey is not simply 'missed' plants? There are really three components to this question: (1) What are the divers' efficiency and ability to locate *C. taxifolia*? (2) What is the minimum size a colony has to attain to assure it will be detected 100% of the time in a standard search effort, and (3) conservatively, how long does it take for the plant to reach a minimum threshold size for assured detection? Part of the 2002/2003 surveys and monitoring efforts have addressed these questions by using ersatz (plastic) caulerpa fronds fastened together to produce 'colonies' of various sizes. In fact, the general efficiency (quality assurance) is now routinely determined by placements of the ersatz targets in locations not known to the search team. The "percent find" for single passes on the transect lines and can range from 30 to 80% depending primarily upon turbidity (clarity) of the water. The minimum size for 100% detection is presently being confirmed using four size ranges of the plastic caulerpa. Once this is known with reasonable certainty, then SCCAT will propose a final eradication timetable. The full set of criteria for establishing this schedule will first be submitted for technical, scientific review by the oversight committee that met in San Diego in January 2001. After review and consideration of comments, an Eradication Schedule (i.e. projected time to declare complete eradication) will be submitted to all stakeholders.

The SCCAT model

A summary of the events leading to the present stage in the SCCAT response is provided in Figure 5. Importantly, 'pre-conditions' were in place at the time the discovery was made. Even though




Figure 4. Progress in reduction in areal coverage of viable colonies of *C. taxifolia* over the past 3 years in Agua Hedionda Lagoon (upper graph) and Huntington Harbour (lower graph). Arrows indicate period of time during which no new colonies have been found. (Modified from Merkel and Associates, 2003 Status Report to SCCAT.)

617 there was no contingency fund in place, nor any
 618 team in place, the level of awareness of the threat
 619 from *C. taxifolia* had been well established, at least
 620 within a small circle of aquatic invasive species sci-
 621 entists and managers (Keppner et al. 1998; Kepp-
 622 ner and Caplen 1999). This heightened awareness
 623 probably shaved weeks to months from on-the-
 624 ground response time. With fortuitous timing,
 625 Alex Meinesz's (1999) warning tome describing
 626 the consequences of no action against this species
 627 in Europe, was published shortly before the Cali-
 628 fornia discovery, and underscored the need to act
 629 quickly.

630 Though the SCCAT approach to the *C. taxifo-*
 631 *lia* infestation is not fundamentally different from

many schemes proposed for rapid response, there
 are some assumptions in these schemes that
 probably should be modified based upon the
 SCCAT model. First, rather than a complex,
 nationally-centralized structure, I believe that the
 requirements for effective rapid responses can be
 distilled to three essential components that must
 be fully integrated at the local level: (1) biological
 and ecological knowledge of the invading species;
 (2) knowledge of the invaded site (physical, eco-
 logical, and sociological); (3) sufficient field
 expertise and resources for immediate action. By
 examining the functions of these components,
 one can understand how to prepare for the even-
 tuality of a new introduction. Second, these com-




Figure 5. SCCAT Rapid Response Model showing the interactions of three essential components and mandatory funding to implement responses, with fully integrated information among the three input components.

ponents, taken separately, will not produce a coordinated, credible or effective response for a simple reason: The expertise within each functional component will only be productive in the context of the input from the other two. For example, phycologists may be knowledgeable about a given algal species and can provide crucial life cycle, reproductive and ecological information. However, without expertise in implementing a 'best eradication' option, or the knowledge of the infested site and pertinent sociological constraints, this biological information alone is not sufficient to develop a feasible strategy for eradication. The converse is of course true as well: scientists and managers versed in approaches and methods for containment, control and eradication may be ill prepared for using those tools without the relevant biological, regulatory, and stakeholder information. The need for this multidisciplinary consortium also suggests that the most effective participants will be those who truly understand their limitations, and who respect the expertise comprising the other components. This is a 'culture' that must be guided by common goals and a willingness to listen carefully to opposing views in order to develop a credible consensus for action. I believe that problems arising from some past reactions to invasive species derive directly from a failure to fully engage each of the three components at the onset of the response. Undoubtedly, SCCAT too would have benefitted

from earlier, public informational stakeholder workshops. This is because the iterative, adaptive management approach that works best necessitates a series of meetings as new information is obtained and changes are proposed.

Third, whatever approach is taken in response to invasive species, adequate, accessible funding is absolutely essential. SCCAT was extremely fortunate in having a fully responsive agency, the San Diego Water Regional Water Control Board that had access to funds. This suggests that several state and federal agencies with resource management mandates must each be provided with a minimum of US \$500,000 for rapid response. In addition, Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between state agencies, and between the states and the federal agencies, must prescribe how these funds can be transferred and shared quickly. The MOU for resource-sharing is equivalent to the practice of facilitating multi-city fire station coordination for responses to large fires.

Lastly, and this is probably the most important difference from other proposed schemes, the successful experiences with the California *H. verticillata* eradication program (California Department of Food and Agriculture 2003), with SCCAT, and with the less well-known sabellid (polychaete) worm eradication in the California abalone industry (Culver et al. 1997; Kuris and Culver 1999; Culver and Kuris 2000) all demonstrate that early and effective responses are locally driven (i.e., either impaired or facilitated), require key local stakeholders, and almost always need to engage local resources. In essence, this is a "bottom-up" model, which recognizes that vital information on infested sites, as well as public buy-in, must be achieved locally, and in the context of all available expertise and knowledge of the target species. The concept is summarized in Figure 5.

Assuming that the model can work, how could it be applied to other putative invasive species? The answer lies in part in the example of *C. taxifolia*'s status before it was discovered in the US (Figure 6). Rather than waiting for the first "find" in a new location, what is needed is a short list of likely invading species- either those yet to reach the US, or those localized in certain regions or states, but with clear potential to

History of Response to *Caulerpa taxifolia* Invasion in the United States**Pre- Discovery Phase:**

1998 Aquatic Nuisance Species Task Force reviewed this threat
 1999 *C. taxifolia* added to the Federal Noxious Weed List
 Draft of "Prevention Program for the Mediterranean Strain
 of *Caulerpa taxifolia*" submitted to the Aquatic Nuisance Species
 Task Force by Caulerpa Prevention Committee.

Post- Discovery Phase:

June 12, 2000 *C. taxifolia* discovered in Agua Hedionda Lagoon, California
 June 15, 18 Multi-Agency meetings held; confirmation of species ID,
 assessment of threat and options for
 response evaluated; consensus for action: Eradicate
 June 29 First eradication treatments begun.
 July, 2000 *C. taxifolia* discovered in Huntington Harbour, California
 Eradication treatments begun
 July, 2001 Conference of "Implementing a National *Caulerpa taxifolia*
 Prevention Program"
 September, 2001 State legislation to ban *C. taxifolia* and 8 other *Caulerpa* species
 signed by Governor
 January, 2002 International Conference on *Caulerpa taxifolia* held in San Diego;
 Scientific Review Panel meets.
 2001-2002 Efficacy assessments; containment and treatment of small colonies
 No new plants found by late, 2002.
 2003-2004 Continued monitoring of both sites; criteria developed for
 declaration of full eradication

Figure 6. Summary of critical events in development of rapid response to *C. taxifolia* by the SCCAT.

729 spread and to damage aquatic resources. From
 730 this list, a "pest-alarm" drill, or exercise is run
 731 for each species in order to identify who (profes-
 732 sionally and by agency and stakeholder group)
 733 will best provide expertise in the three rapid
 734 response components that I have described ear-
 735 lier. This telling exercise will quickly ferret out
 736 gaps in operational abilities (e.g., training
 737 needed, resources available), as well as identify
 738 likely pathways and sites of introduction. It will
 739 also identify scientists who are knowledgeable
 740 about the species' biology and those who are
 741 willing to be placed on standby. This will clarify
 742 ownership of likely infestation sites and help
 743 identify and resolve regulatory issues so that
 744 these do not impede timely action. Ideally, a spe-
 745 cies-specific response team could be designated
 746 and ready to act on a new discovery within a few
 747 days. Even if the new species is not from the ori-
 748 ginal target list, most of the pre-infestation work
 749 will have been done anyway. Figure 7 summa-
 750 rizes a 'pest alarm' approach and suggests that
 751 these teams might be called a 'NIPIT', for Non-
 752 native Invasive Pest Intervention Team. I suggest
 753 that this alarm exercise might cost around
 754 US\$5,000 per species, and that this up-front

investment would reap tremendous return in
 shortening response time, providing effective use
 of resources and in elevating the public's aware-
 ness for the need to prevent establishment of
 these organisms. The recent report of yet another
 algal invasion, this time by *Caulerpa racemosa* in
 the Mediterranean Sea and Canary Islands (Verl-
 aque, personal communication), suggests that
 this type of exercise and preparedness is urgently
 needed.

In summary, SCCAT has been extremely suc-
 cessful in spite of, and perhaps because of, the
 fact that no single agency federal, state, or local
 had both the authority and resources to imple-
 ment actual eradication fieldwork. This circum-
 stance required fluidity, flexibility and pragmatic
 decision-making. A collaborative culture was
 developed, wherein creative, adaptive problem
 solving has been the hallmark, and where the
 contributions of a wide range of public and pri-
 vate entities were essential. SCCAT continues
 to perform an effective role in facilitating and
 optimizing the use of resources to achieve the
 consensus goal: Eradication of *C. taxifolia* for
 the protection of California's coastal ecosys-
 tems.




Figure 7. Summary of 'Pest Alarm' exercise steps used to identify essential components for a rapid response to invasive species, and formation of operational non-native Invasive Species Intervention Teams, or 'NIPITS'.

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Control Board. 799

Appendix I

Sources of funding and approximate total amounts (US\$) provided for *C. taxifolia* eradication from 2000–2003. (Note: Use of some funding extends to 2005.)

| Contributing organization | Funds and other in-kind support |
|---|--|
| San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board (via State Water Resources Control Board) | Designated <i>C. taxifolia</i> as 'pollutant' Approximately \$2.0 million Provided for emergency 'cleanup' funding support; outreach and education.; research on high-energy habitat detection; participation by staff on SCCAT (SCCAT Chair/ Steering Committee) |
| Santa Ana Regional Water Quality Control Board (via State Water Resources Control Board) | Emergency clean up/abatement funds for Huntington Harbour infestation; approximately \$700,000. Participation on SCCAT |
| California Department of Fish and Game | Directed funds of approximately \$945,000. (Eradication, surveillance, research via UCD & ARS, outreach/education) Participation by staff on SCCAT (Steering Committee) |
| California Coastal Conservancy | Grant of \$1.3 million for eradication/monitoring (via Agua Hedionda Lagoon Foundation) |
| California Department of Parks and Recreation UC Davis/Research UC Davis/Extension | \$15,000. Scientific Review process (via CDFG) Phycological expertise; scientific support for improved eradication methods; research on chlorine efficacy; scientists Participation on SCCAT |
| US Department of Agriculture-Agricultural Research Service-Exotic and Invasive Weed Research | Scientific expertise in control and eradication of aquatic plants and algae; in-kind support for early assessment of algacides and assessment of treatment efficacy; scientist participation on SCCAT (Steering Committee) |
| National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA-Fisheries) | Approximately \$300,000; Support to deal with Coastal Commission permits; staff scientist participation on SCCAT (Steering Committee) |
| US Fish and Wildlife Service (Coastal Program) and ANS Task Force | \$212,000. for eradication/ surveillance (via NOAA-Fisheries); \$40,000 (Scientific Review Panel) |
| Cabrillo Power, LLC | Early, rapid funding of ca. \$123,000. to help support eradication; Participation on SCCAT |
| Merkel and Associates, Inc. | First detection and notification; contractor for operational, hands-on eradication field team; outreach/education; Participation on SCCAT |
| Agua Hedionda Lagoon Foundation | Public liaison and awareness; support for obtaining regulatory changes and funding; negotiations for adjusted Agua Hedionda Lagoon uses; obtained grants for eradication totaling approximately \$2 million (310(h) funds and Ca.Coast.Comm.) |
| City of Carlsbad, CA | Security at Agua Hedionda Lagoon site; enforcement of boating restrictions; community outreach; staff participation on SCCAT |

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